Tame Tory Hacks’? The Ulster Party at Westminster, 1922-72 by Jackson, Alvin
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tame Tory Hacks’?  The Ulster Party at Westminster, 1922-72
Citation for published version:
Jackson, A 2011, 'Tame Tory Hacks’?  The Ulster Party at Westminster, 1922-72' Historical Journal, vol. 54,
no. 2, pp. 453-475. DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X11000094
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S0018246X11000094
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Historical Journal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Jackson, A. (2011). Tame Tory Hacks’? The Ulster Party at Westminster, 1922-72. Historical Journal, 54(2), doi:
10.1017/S0018246X11000094
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
The Historical Journal
http://journals.cambridge.org/HIS
Additional services for The Historical Journal:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
‘TAME TORY HACKS’? THE ULSTER PARTY AT 
WESTMINSTER, 1922–1972
ALVIN JACKSON
The Historical Journal / Volume 54 / Issue 02 / June 2011, pp 453 ­ 475
DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X11000094, Published online: 11 May 2011
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0018246X11000094
How to cite this article:
ALVIN JACKSON (2011). ‘TAME TORY HACKS’? THE ULSTER PARTY AT 
WESTMINSTER, 1922–1972. The Historical Journal, 54, pp 453­475 doi:10.1017/
S0018246X11000094
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/HIS, IP address: 129.215.19.194 on 18 Jun 2013
‘ TAME TORY HACKS ’ ? 1 THE ULSTER
PARTY AT WESTMINSTER , 1922–1972*
ALV IN J ACKSON
University of Edinburgh
A B S T R ACT. While the historiography on Ulster Unionism after partition has grown considerably in
recent years, there has been no extended investigation of Unionism at Westminster (‘ the Ulster Party ’), its
structures and eﬀectiveness. This article uses new archival material to shed light upon the Party’s
membership, governance, coherence, and wider engagement. The later sections of the article review the nature
of the ties binding the Party to Stormont and to Conservatism, unravelling some of their complexity, and
placing a particular emphasis upon the relationship between Westminster Unionism and the fall of the
devolved government in 1972. Here, new evidence is adduced from several underexploited or fresh sources to
shed light upon the workings of the Party in the years immediately before this debacle. It is argued that the
Westminster Unionists’ (at best) highly ambiguous reaction to direct rule was a ﬁtting culmination to ﬁfty
years of often jealous and defensive interaction with Stormont.
I
Among the many political issues raised by devolution since 1997 has been the
tension binding members of the House of Commons, their regional parliament or
assembly, and their local party structure. But, as with so much else arising from
the debate on devolution, here, too, the theory and practice of Home Rule in
Ireland has a great deal to oﬀer by way of insight and precedent. Just as the
numbers and rights of Scots, Welsh, and Northern Irish members have been
periodically revisited in the context of Blairite devolution, so Gladstone laboured
over the problem of Irish representation at Westminster in the context of
a Home Rule assembly or parliament in Dublin. His various solutions to this,
the ‘West Lothian Question’, as it had become known by the 1970s, are familiar ;
the notion of reduced numbers of Irish MPs, and the discarded idea of
School of History, Classics and Archaeology, University of Edinburgh, Doorway 4, Teviot Place, Edinburgh
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* The author is grateful to the British Academy and the Carnegie Trust for supporting the research
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1 David Jeﬀcock, Conservative Research Department Memorandum, 24 Aug. 1965 (referring to a
comment by George Brown), Cambridge, Churchill College, Robin Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK
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‘ in and out ’ – excluding Irish members from certain types of parliamentary
division – have all been thoroughly rehearsed in the weighty literature on Home
Rule.
But it was not only the technical and constitutional features of devolution
that were anticipated by the Home Rule debates ; other, more qualitative, issues
were also raised during the welter of speculation about the future of Ireland’s
government. It was expected by some that, with the advent of Home Rule,
the combination of an Irish parliament and representation at Westminster would
prove damaging both to Irish and English interests : A. V. Dicey, in arguing
against ‘dual representation ’, thought that the calibre of Irish representation in
London might well suﬀer, that moderate business-like leaders would be dis-
couraged, and that ‘ the supremacy in Ireland of professional politicians ’ would
be sustained. In Unionist lampoons of the 1890s, the prospective Dublin parlia-
ment was envisioned as the centre-stage of Irish politics, albeit one occupied by
the corrupt and belligerent.2 When a Home Rule parliament was launched in
Belfast in 1921 for the six counties of Northern Ireland, some of these expectations
and prognoses appeared to be fulﬁlled. The political scientist, Philip Norton, has
observed that the Ulster Unionist members at Westminster ‘were rarely of a
calibre to attract attention from the Whips and Ministers ’ ; the Belfast academic
and commentator, John Harbinson, has damned them as ‘political eunuchs ’.3
Such views prevail in the now weighty literature on Northern Ireland and
British–Irish relations in the prelude to the ‘Troubles ’, and they are conﬁrmed by
a wide range of evidence.4 But the perception of Westminster as the remedial class
of Ulster Unionism is only a part of a more complex and problematic political
history. The Ulster Unionists at Westminster between 1922 and 1972 did indeed
include choleric, incoherent, and intolerant ‘Colonel Blimp’ ﬁgures (David Low’s
designation has often been applied). But, while the historiography on Ulster
Unionism has grown considerably in recent years, and while individual Ulster
Unionist MPs or episodes have occasionally been dissected, there has been no
extended investigation of the ‘Ulster Party ’, its structures and eﬀectiveness, ex-
cepting a brief and dismissive chapter published in 1973.5
2 [F. Frankfort Moore], The diary of an Irish cabinet minister (Belfast, 1893), and The Viceroy Muldoon
(Belfast, 1893). For a variant of the argument see A. V. Dicey, A leap in the dark : a criticism of the principles of
Home Rule as illustrated by the bill of 1893 (London, 1911), pp. 38–9.
3 Philip Norton, ‘Conservative politics and the abolition of Stormont’, in Peter Catterall and Sean
MacDougall, eds., The Northern Ireland question in British politics (London, 1996), p. 130; John Harbinson,
The Ulster Unionist Party, 1882–1973: its development and organisation (Belfast, 1973), p. 106.
4 E.g. the excellent studies by Graham Walker, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party : protest, pragmatism
and pessimism (Manchester, 2004), pp. 179, 196, and by Marc Mulholland, Northern Ireland at the crossroads :
Ulster Unionism in the O’Neill years, 1960–1969 (London, 2000), p. 163, which stresses the Westminster
Unionists ’ ‘ inarticulateness’ in 1968–9.
5 Harbinson, Ulster Unionist Party, pp. 97–106. None of the most important recent studies of post-
partition Unionism – Walker, History ; Henry Patterson and Eric Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism in
Northern Ireland since 1945 (Manchester, 2007) ; or Mulholland, Northern Ireland at the crossroads – is pri-
marily concerned with Westminster Unionism. Jeremy Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends?’’ : the
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The structure of this article may also be brieﬂy explained. The ﬁrst section uses
new archival material to shed light upon the Party’s membership, structure,
coherence, and workings ; little has hitherto been written on these, the mechanics
of parliamentary Unionism at Westminster. The second and third sections
review the nature of the relationships binding the Party to Stormont and to
Conservatism, with a particular emphasis upon the relationship between
Westminster Unionism and the fall of the devolved government. Here new evi-
dence is adduced from several underexploited or (like the Robin Chichester-
Clark papers) fresh sources to shed light upon the workings of the Party in the
years before 1972.
I I
Westminster had long been a focus for Irish politics before 1920; and just as the
Irish parliamentary party had eﬀectively led the Nationalist movement from the
time of Butt and Parnell through to 1916–18, so an Ulster Party in the Commons
had simultaneously fulﬁlled the same broad function within Irish Unionism. With
the creation of an Ulster Unionist Council in Belfast in 1905, and with the popular
extra-parliamentary mobilization of Unionism in 1912–14, so the overall import-
ance of the Commons for Unionists weakened. This was certainly a gradual and
uneven retreat, characterized by occasional rallies such as in 1918–22, when Sinn
Fe´in boycotted the British parliament, and the Unionists temporarily exercised
a near monopoly of Irish inﬂuence. But the overall trajectory had long been
apparent ; and in May 1921, when the Ulster parliament and executive met for the
ﬁrst time, Belfast was conﬁrmed as the principal political focus of Unionism and
of the partition state.
Westminster, however, retained control of most forms of taxation, together
with all foreign and Commonwealth and military matters. Thus Northern Ireland
had to be represented, not simply by the legislature in Belfast, but also in London;
at ﬁrst (following the template of Gladstonian Home Rule) a reduced number of
MPs, thirteen, were returned from the North to the British House of Commons,
though this was later amended to twelve, with the Representation of the People
Act (1948) (and – later still, in 1978 – increased to seventeen, as James Callaghan’s
Labour government did deals and struggled for survival).
Those Unionists who reached Westminster in the years between 1922 and 1972
continued to be collectively dubbed the ‘Ulster Party ’ as their predecessors had
Conservative Party and Ulster in the twentieth century’, English Historical Review, 121, 490 (Feb. 2006),
pp. 70–103, contains some mention of the Westminster MPs, but is concerned with the evolution of the
wider relationship between Conservatism and Unionism, particularly from the perspective of the
former. For the use of ‘Blimp’ or ‘blimpish’ in these contexts see, for example, Walker, History, p. 156,
and Andrew Gailey, ed., Crying in the wilderness : Jack Sayers, a liberal editor in Ulster, 1963–1969 (Belfast,
1995), p. 94. Compare Alvin Jackson, The Ulster Party : Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884–1911
(Oxford, 1989), pp. 53–113, where the problems of assessing the distinctiveness and achievement of the
Edwardian Ulster Party are reviewed.
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been since the mid-1880s ; in reality, however, the Ulster Party functioned in a
manner broadly analogous to some other regional groupings within British
Conservatism in the era, such as the Scottish Unionist Members’ Committee.
Given the paucity of detail elsewhere, a brief outline of its membership, workings,
and impact may ﬁrst be oﬀered.
Like the Scottish Unionists, the Ulster Unionists elected sessional chairmen
and secretaries, sustaining a tradition which had begun with Edward Saunderson
(member for North Armagh) and William Ellison-Macartney (South Antrim) in
1885 : the ﬁrst of the chairs in the post-partition era were Charles Curtis Craig
(member for County Antrim) in 1922–3 and David Reid (County Down), who
served from 1923 until 1939. The ﬁrst secretaries of the Party in the new era were
Reid (1922–3) and then Sir Michael Macnaghten (County Antrim) who served
from 1923 until 1928. In addition, the Party was bound by a formal constitution, a
copy of which, dating from about 1950, survives in the Montgomery Hyde papers.
Its dominant principle was of course maintenance of the Union, although inter-
estingly (at least in the Attlee era) this was expressly conditional upon the nature
of political change in Britain, and upon the Protestantism of the crown. True to
the original conception, as formulated in 1885–6, the Ulster grouping was to be
‘an independent party ’, and its members were free to take whatever whip they
chose; it was recognized, however, that in practice members might generally take
the Conservative whip. Signiﬁcantly, members were not delegates of the Unionist
government in Belfast, but clearly the ‘closest possible liaison’ was desirable, and
the views of Belfast ministers would carry ‘considerable authority ’.6
Between 1922 and 1972 the members of this Party comprised the ﬁfty-seven
Unionists who were returned from constituencies of Northern Ireland to the
House of Commons at Westminster. Only two of this total were women: as a
whole the group was indeed middle class and middle aged. The average age of the
Party on ﬁrst election (1922–66) was 46.5 years.7 It may be assumed that the great
majority of the ﬁfty-seven MPs were members of the Orange Order, although the
evidence in numerous individual cases is unclear. The Party was comparatively
well educated, with a large and rising proportion of university graduates, em-
bracing 45 per cent of those elected in 1922 and 72 per cent of those returned
in 1966 (again, ﬁgures roughly analogous to the contemporary Conservative
parliamentary party).8 John Harbinson has calculated that the overwhelming
majority of the Ulster Party were recruited from the professional and business
classes, with 90 per cent of those elected in 1922 falling into this category
(once again a ﬁgure consistent with that of the contemporary Conservative
parliamentary party).9 Company directors and barristers were a predominant
6 Undated memorandum, Belfast, Public Record Oﬃce of Northern Ireland (PRONI),
Montgomery Hyde papers, D.3084/I/B/3.
7 Harbinson, Ulster Unionist Party, p. 100. Compare Michael Rush, The role of the Member of Parliament
since 1868: from gentlemen to players (Oxford, 2001), p. 133.
8 Rush, Role of the Member of Parliament, p. 99. 9 Ibid., p. 98.
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force in the Party throughout the ﬁfty years covered by this study, though in the
1920s two of the main Unionist newspapers were represented in the shape of
Thomas Moles, member for South Belfast and managing editor of the Belfast
Telegraph, and Sir Robert Lynn, member for West Belfast and managing editor of
the Northern Whig. This representation of the press was a signiﬁcant asset, but it
had disappeared by the 1930s, and was not to be restored. Throughout the period
1922–72 the landed elite was represented, in a sustained if highly vestigial manner.
But, as a counterpoint to this aristocratic motif, it was also clear that the Party of
the 1950s and 1960s was enjoying a relative democratization, in so far as smaller-
scale businessmen and professionals were beginning to feature within its ranks.
There was no clear pattern to the manner of selection, and local party ma-
chinery could be ineﬃcient or dysfunctional. Local notables and family and
professional linkages exercised a disproportionate inﬂuence at all levels of the
highly enclosed and interconnected politics of Northern Ireland. As elsewhere
in Ireland, dynastic succession was important. For example, Robert (Robin)
Chichester-Clark’s grandfather had sat for South Derry at Westminster, while his
grandmother had sat for the same constituency in the Northern Ireland parlia-
ment, as had his father : Chichester-Clark was elected for Londonderry in 1955,
and held the seat until 1974. Sir Hugh O’Neill was at the centre of a yet
more complex dynastic and parliamentary web: his uncle, brother, and son all
represented Antrim at Westminster between 1885 and 1959, while his nephew,
Terence, considered standing for the Westminster Antrim seat, but instead
pursued a career at Stormont culminating in the premiership.10
Wealth was in general a characteristic of the Party because – even in the
1950s – local associations (who exercised very considerable autonomy in the
matter) tended to prefer candidates who could carry all or most of the costs of their
election. When Chichester-Clark was seeking nomination for the Londonderry
constituency in 1954, he was told that in the immediate past candidates had been
expected to pay all the expenses, but that he would be required ‘only ’ to ﬁnd two-
thirds of the total : a contested election was reckoned to cost £700, an uncontested
election £200.11 One partial consequence of this unwillingness to pay for talent
was that, by the early 1960s – precisely the time when the pressures on Ulster
Unionism were beginning to grow – the perceived quality of Unionist parlia-
mentary candidates for Westminster was beginning to ﬂag. In July 1963 Jack
Sayers, editor of the Belfast Telegraph, wrote to Chichester-Clark, complaining of
the mediocre quality of parliamentary candidates and observing that ‘ I don’t like
to see the chancy way in which seats are being ﬁlled nowadays … our opinion is
10 Robin Chichester-Clark (RCC) to McCay, 29 May 1954, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/12.
For Robin Chichester-Clark see, for example, Clive Scoular, James Chichester-Clark, prime minister of
Northern Ireland (Killyleagh, 2000), pp. 26–32. For Hugh O’Neill and his nephew see Alvin Jackson,
Home Rule : an Irish history, 1800–2000 (London, 2003), p. 239. For the limits of local party organization
see Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism, pp. 4–5.
11 McCay to RCC, 9 July 1954, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/12. For the impecuniousness of
local Unionism see Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, p. 87.
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that Providence can’t be counted on to take a hand’. Chichester-Clark agreed;
but in fact there is no evidence that the Unionist leadership successfully wrested
the initiative on this score from the clutch of Providence.12
On the other hand, departure from the constituency was precipitated by a
variety of causes, but rarely (as in Britain) by electoral defeat. De-selection, as in
Britain, was certainly a threat to those who deﬁed the conventions of local politics.
As in Britain, this was a complex area, where it was not always clear whether
candidates had jumped from their party’s nomination, or had been quietly
pushed. Nor, given the layers of apologetic and spin, is it always possible to
identify the precise causes of an eviction, when it had unmistakably occurred.
Perhaps the most controversial case in this period was that of Harford
Montgomery Hyde, member for North Belfast (1950–9), who was de-selected
because (he said) of his liberal views on a range of issues, particularly reform of the
law on homosexuality. There can be little doubt that Hyde’s stand on gay rights
together with his opposition to the death penalty reﬂected a more generous and
progressive political outlook than that which characterized the majority of his
constituents. On the other hand, he had been a remote, ineﬃcient, and self-
indulgent MP; and in the winter of 1958–9, when unemployment in Belfast was
spiralling, and when the crisis over his de-selection was brewing, Hyde found
himself on a lengthy fact-ﬁnding mission in the Caribbean. In early 1959 he
was writing self-righteous letters to his constituency secretary under the letter
head of the Myrtle Bank Hotel, Kingston, Jamaica: equally he was receiving
letters addressed to ‘Dear Piggy ’ from society ladies.13 Urgent calls from his
friends to return to Ireland were ignored ; and his removal as Unionist parlia-
mentary candidate inevitably ensued.
If de-selection was one obvious expression of popular displeasure, then minis-
terial oﬃce and honours may be seen as tangible evidence of success or accept-
ance or usefulness within the arena of high politics. No member of the Party
achieved cabinet rank during this period, unless the deﬁnition is stretched to
include Ulster Unionists in the Upper House (such as the seventh marquess of
Londonderry).14 There is also evidence that several Unionists unsuccessfully peti-
tioned for oﬃce.15 However, while the tally of junior ministers is usually treated as
derisory, it is rarely given in full : James Craig was ﬁnancial secretary to the
admiralty and acting ﬁrst lord (1920–1) before returning to Belfast as the founding
prime minister of Northern Ireland. His brother, Charles Curtis Craig, was
12 Jack Sayers to RCC, 2 July 1964; RCC to Sayers (copy), 5 July 1963, Chichester-Clark papers,
CCLK 1/6. See Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, p. 87.
13 Hyde to Noble, 23 Feb. 1959, Montgomery Hyde papers, D.3084/I/A/2/41. See also Jayne
Campbell to ‘Dear Piggy’, 21 Jan. 1959, D.3084/I/A/3/9. Harbinson, Ulster Unionist Party, p. 83.
14 Norton, ‘Conservative politics ’, p. 130. For Londonderry see evaluations by Ian Kershaw,Making
friends with Hitler : Lord Londonderry and the roots of appeasement (London, 2004), and N. C. Fleming,
The marquess of Londonderry : aristocracy, power and politics in Britain and Ireland (London, 2005).
15 W. J. Allen to Baldwin, 3 June 1929, Cambridge University Library, Baldwin papers, v.37,
fos. 9–10.
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parliamentary secretary at the Ministry of Pensions (1923–4), a post which James
himself had occupied in 1918–20. Sir Hugh O’Neill served as chairman of the
Conservative Private Members (1922) Committee between 1935 and 1939, and
was under secretary for India and Burma under Neville Chamberlain in 1939–40.
In 1951, Conolly Gage (the ‘greatly respected ’ member for South Belfast between
1945 and 1952) turned down Churchill’s oﬀer of the parliamentary secretaryship
at Pensions.16 If, as has been suggested, these MPs were indeed ‘rarely of a calibre
to attract attention from the Whips and Ministers ’, then Robin Chichester-Clark
was both a whip and a minister : a lord commissioner of the treasury (1960–1),
comptroller of the royal household (1961–4), and minister of state for employment
(1972–4).
The contribution of Party members naturally varied extensively, though the
mean remained (by the standards of contemporary mainstream Conservatism)
comparatively low. The political scientist Michael Rush has taken eight parlia-
mentary sessions between 1887 and 1994–5, and examined average participation
by government and opposition backbenchers, and by third party MPs other than
the Ulster Unionists : three of his eight selected sessions fall within the period
covered by this study (1928, 1947–8, 1961–2).17 Calculating the contributions of the
Ulster Unionists in these years, and comparing these ﬁgures with those supplied
by Rush, reveals a pattern of relatively low Unionist parliamentary activity
before 1972, and a marked consolidation of eﬀort after that year. Ulster Unionists’
contributions to debate and parliamentary questions were extremely slight in the
sample year 1928, with a mean of little more than one question and one contri-
bution for each MP (as compared with means of around eleven questions and six
contributions for Conservative backbenchers). In the session of 1947–8 Unionist
activity was rather more marked (means of nineteen questions and sixteen con-
tributions), but remained less than the average Conservative eﬀort (means of ﬁfty-
seven questions and thirty-eight contributions). In 1961–2 Unionists asked on
average six questions per MP, and made on average twelve contributions to
debate : Conservative backbenchers asked on average fourteen questions and
made on average sixteen contributions to debate. Rush’s ﬁgures suggest that after
1972 Ulster Unionists were generally working harder than Conservative and
Labour MPs, made roughly similar numbers of contributions to debate as the
Liberal, Scottish Nationalists, and Plaid Cymru, but did not make the same use of
parliamentary questions as these three parties. Broadly the picture is of a rela-
tively low level of eﬀort, with a particular trough in 1928, a limited degree of
advance after 1945, and more sustained eﬀort after 1972.
16 ‘Leaves of memory’, Montgomery Hyde papers, D.3084/A/7/1, fo. 290. Interview with Rt Hon.
H. V. Kirk, Belfast, 6 Sept. 2004. Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, p. 85.
17 Rush, Role of the Member of Parliament, pp. 159–60. Ulster Unionist ﬁgures compiled from Hansard,
5th ser., vol. 221 (1928 session),Hansard, 5th ser., vol. 455 (1947–8 session) andHansard, 5th ser., vol. 665
(1961–2).
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While there were some structural explanations for the lastingly modest
achievements of the Ulster Party, it was also clear that its overall quality waxed
and waned. The impact of the new Belfast parliament upon the Party seems to
have been delayed, and its quality (if not its volubility) remained high in the 1920s
and 1930s : its quality was also relatively high as late as the 1950s. In that decade it
still had the (admittedly mixed) beneﬁts of highly experienced veterans like Hugh
O’Neill, together with eﬃcient stalwarts such as Douglas Savory. Sir David
Campbell (member for South Belfast, 1952–63) brought extensive administrative
experience to the Party as a colonial civil servant and wartime governor of Malta.
The Party was broadly similar in terms of its composition and activities to con-
temporary Conservatism. Indeed, the essential challenge faced by the Ulster
Party in the era of Churchill and Macmillan was not its marginality, but rather its
apparent integration within the Conservative establishment. The challenge faced
by the Party in the 1960s was that it had to deal with the consequences of this
perceived intimacy.
I I I
The central relationships for the members of the Ulster Party of 1922–72 were
those which linked them to Stormont and to the two main parties of the British
state, and the British government. In theory, the Party defended and represented
the interests of the devolved government at Westminster, and constituted a source
of political intelligence for the Belfast ministers. At its best the Party could be
eﬀective in fulﬁlling this brief : for example, in 1924–5 Ulster members regularly
supplied James Craig, as prime minister of Northern Ireland, with information
and legal insight concerning the Boundary Commission.18 Provision for the rec-
tiﬁcation of the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State had
been an essential element of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 ; and in
1924 this provision was activated in the form of a Boundary Commission. The
brief of the Commission was reviewed by the Judicial Committee of the privy
council in May 1924, when Sir Malcolm Macnaghten (as secretary of the Party)
supplied Craig with legal assessments and strategic advice.19 Thereafter David
Reid, as chairman of the Party, and Herbert Dixon, who was both member for
East Belfast and Craig’s political ‘ﬁxer ’, provided detailed intelligence and useful
gossip to the prime minister in Belfast. Reid regularly and secretly dined with
Joseph Fisher, the unoﬃcial Ulster representative on the Commission, and passed
on details of its operations to Craig. This leakage of intelligence allowed the
Belfast government to hoan its strategies, and meant that both Dixon and Craig
could mobilize their political allies. For example, primed by Fisher, Reid pressed
18 Jackson,Home Rule, pp. 211–12; Kevin Matthews, Fatal inﬂuence : the impact of Ireland on British politics,
1920–1925 (Dublin, 2004), pp. 206, 217.
19 Macnaghten to Craig, 5 May 1924, 18 June 1924, 22 June 1924, 24 June 1924, Belfast, PRONI,
CAB 9Z/11/1.
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the issue of the town of Newry with the Conservative home secretary, William
Joynson-Hicks : Newry, which had also been a possible gain for the Free State,
was spared, and Reid considered it likely that Feetham had been given a ‘hint ’
from the Home Oﬃce.20
The Boundary Commission episode supplies a case-study of eﬀective
communication between the Ulster Party and Belfast, and of the ways in which
the Party was able to mobilize its resources in the Unionist interest. But it would
be wrong to argue that this reﬂected the normal state of communication between
the Ulster Party and Belfast. On the contrary, this was a connection and a
relationship which could not be taken for granted, and which indeed were
continually revisited and reworked throughout the ﬁfty years of devolved
government.
As is well known, periods of Labour administration imposed a particular
strain on these communications, because the interests of Stormont and of its
Ulster Party tended to diverge. The Unionist leadership in Belfast was generally
pragmatic, understanding the need to placate British governments of whatever
political hue; and it was also the case that – for essentially constitutional
reasons – Stormont ministers did not want a legislative gap opening up between
Britain and Northern Ireland in areas such as welfare provision. This meant
that ‘ socialistic ’ legislation which the Ulster Unionist Party in London opposed
(disciplined, as they often were, by the Conservative whip) was readily accepted
by the Ulster Unionist Party in Belfast. The need for eﬀective co-ordination and
communication between the Ulster Party and Belfast was particularly clear.
In fact this ﬁrst became evident during the Labour administration of 1929–31,
when the Ulster Party was disposed to toe the Conservative line and when James
Craig in Belfast was anxious for a more modulated approach. Several episodes
in late 1929 created particular problems: the Belfast government, for example,
wanted to accept Labour’s Widows and Orphans Bill, while the Ulster Party was
voting with the Conservative Party to amend the proposed legislation. Tensions
over these issues underlined the need to establish ‘complete harmony of action,
both locally and imperially ’.21 As a consequence, the Belfast government decided
that, whenever it was aﬀected by British legislation, the relevant local minister
would liaise with the chairman of the Ulster Party.
With the creation of the National Government in 1931, these tensions between
Belfast and Westminster were partly alleviated. Personality as well as structure
contributed to the maintenance of communication; and Sir Joseph McConnell,
the eﬃcient secretary of the Ulster Party in the 1930s, sustained eﬀective links with
Belfast. But McConnell died in 1942; and this and a variety of other, wartime,
circumstances forefronted the issue of liaison. The welter of government business
during the war meant that the pressure on lines of communication was increasing,
as were the opportunities for divergence between Belfast and the Ulster Party.
20 D. D. Reid to Craig, 16 Oct. 1925, PRONI, CAB 9Z/2/2.
21 H. Pollock to Reid, 15 Nov. 1929, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/1.
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Basil Brooke (who became prime minister of Northern Ireland in April 1943)
was at ﬁrst more proactive in addressing these diﬃculties than his predecessor,
the niggling and remote John Andrews. In June 1943 Brooke wrote to the new
secretary of the Ulster group, Douglas Savory, setting up a meeting between the
Stormont cabinet and the Westminster MPs: the purpose of this was to eﬀect
improvements in communication between the two.22 By January 1944 it had been
agreed to form an ‘ inner cabinet ’ of the Westminster party, whose members
were now to shadow individual Stormont ministers (for example, Hugh O’Neill,
the chairman of the Party, was to shadow Brooke himself).23 But, despite Brooke’s
anxiety on the subject, and despite the new structures, diﬃculties remained.
The fundamental challenge posed by Labour in 1945 to the Ulster Party and
the devolved government was essentially that faced in 1929–31. The Stormont
government desired to maintain good relations with the administration in
London, and often to adopt its legislation for Northern Ireland, while the Ulster
Party felt pressured by its Conservative allies to contribute to the Opposition.
Samuel Haughton was the secretary of the Party at this time, and he worked hard
to keep the Ulster Unionists at Westminster in communication with Belfast. It was
often a forlorn campaign, however, and for many Stormont Unionists in the late
1940s and 1950s (such as H. V. Kirk) the ‘Imperial MPs were a race apart ’.24 In
March 1947, the Ulster Party was opposed to Labour’s National Insurance Bill,
which Brooke in Belfast deemed to be ‘vital to Northern Ireland’.25 By October
1947, when Brooke had his annual meeting with the Party, its members were
complaining that they had opposed Labour’s Health Services Bill and the Trade
Statistics Bill, only to ﬁnd that the Unionist government was proposing to enact
these measures at Stormont. The Party was reduced to pleading that Brooke
might introduce cosmetic changes into the Stormont versions of this legislation in
order to maintain some semblance of credibility and independence.26
Liaison fragmented, not solely because of the pressure of radical legislation, but
because of the ongoing issue of divisions within the Ulster Party itself. Haughton,
though a wealthy mill owner and a retired oﬃcer, was no Blimp; he struggled
to maintain lines of communication with Belfast, and argued that the Tories’
case against nationalization was overstated and in need of ‘reorientation’.27
Haughton, like Brooke, was on good terms with a number of the Labour cabinet
22 Brooke to Savory, 8 June 1943, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/2. Harbinson gives an abbreviated and
inaccurate summary of these connections in Ulster Unionist Party, p. 103.
23 Robert Gransden, ‘Memorandum on liaison between the Northern Ireland government and
Ulster Imperial Members. Meeting, 19 January 1944’, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/2.
24 Interview with the Rt Hon. H. V. Kirk, Belfast (20 Sept. 2004). For a general summary of the
relationship between Stormont and the Labour government after the Second World War see Brian
Barton, ‘The impact of World War II on Northern Ireland and Belfast–London relations’, in Catterall
and McDougall, eds., Northern Ireland question, pp. 63–4.
25 Minutes of a meeting between the prime minister and the Ulster Party, 18 Mar. 1947, PRONI,
CAB 9J/6/2.
26 Minutes of a meeting between the prime minister and the Ulster Party, 23 Oct. 1947, PRONI,
CAB 9J/6/2. 27 Haughton to Gransden, 20 May 1946, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/2.
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ministers : Haughton courted the secretary of state for war, A. V. Alexander, and
the home secretary, James Chuter-Ede, who both proved helpful and friendly.
Such overtures were important : they built on a lingering sense of gratitude for
Ulster’s wartime eﬀorts, and they helped to prepare some of the ground for
Attlee’s Ireland Act of 1949, wherein partition and the authority of the Stormont
administration were conﬁrmed.28 By the end of the 1940s at least some of the
hostility which Labour had shown towards Ulster Unionism had been eﬀectively
dispelled.
But this was not the whole story of the Ulster Party’s relations with Labour.
There was a core of the Party, deeply Conservative in its outlook and sympathies,
which refused to be harnessed by the pragmatists. For these hardliners, liaison
with Stormont inevitably meant being nudged towards an accommodation with
the socialist government and its misdeeds. As Haughton observed in July 1950,
‘ some of the old hands in the Ulster group at Westminster were not one bit keen
in 1945 to participate in the scheme of liaison I tried so hard to promote and
maintain … there were a good many Parliamentarians here in Ulster who dis-
liked any form of collaboration with the various Ministries in Whitehall ’.29
Between 1945 and 1951 Brooke, together with Haughton and other moderates,
was just about able to counterbalance these hardliners, and to win an accom-
modation with Labour. But this coup would not be repeated in 1964, when
Labour returned to power.
Moreover, despite the reforms of the 1940s, there remained in the 1950s and
1960s personal and structural diﬃculties vitiating the relationship between
Westminster Unionism and its Stormont counterpart – diﬃculties which culmi-
nated in the crisis of Unionism in 1972. Liaison between Stormont ministers and
Westminster spokesmen continued through the 1950s, but began to be weakened
through (in part) personal tensions.30 Moreover, Brookeborough, having spon-
sored reform in the 1940s, subsequently resisted pressure to set up a study group
on the position of the Westminster MPs.31
The pairing arrangements began to weaken further in the early 1960s, when
Stormont and Westminster Unionism were taking variant stands on issues such
as the Common Market and the local engineering industry. With Bill Craig’s
appointment as chief whip at Stormont in 1962 came an opportunity to address
the ‘ silly and conﬂicting public pronouncements ’ issuing forth from the two
parliamentary parties : Craig sought ‘ to establish some sort of link between the
parliamentary party at Stormont and the group at Westminster [because] I don’t
think contact at cabinet level is enough’.32 Craig’s initiative was welcomed by
Chichester-Clark in London and by Terence O’Neill in Belfast, but did not eﬀect
28 Chuter Ede to Attlee, 9 May 1949, Bodleian Library Oxford, Clement Attlee papers, dep. 82,
fo. 311. 29 Haughton to Gransden, 18 July 1950, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/2.
30 O’Neill to RCC, 16 Nov. 1959, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/5.
31 Diary notes, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/22.
32 Craig to RCC, 10 July 1962, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/5.
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a permanent betterment in the relationship between the two parties. The lax
organizational and disciplinary structures of the Unionist party, together with
intense jealousies and the relatively narrow focus of many Westminster MPs, all
militated against a thorough-going and lasting reform. A liaison committee met in
the Whips’ Oﬃce in June 1963, and advocated mutually supportive speeches,
reciprocal visits, monthly reporting, and better use of the newly appointed
research oﬃcer for Northern Ireland at Conservative Central Oﬃce.33 But in July
1963 James Chichester-Clark reported to his brother Robin that Stormont
Unionists were opposed to the notion of ‘Imperial Members ’ attending ‘our
Party meetings ’ (the language of ownership is surely signiﬁcant).34 And in
November 1963 Robin was writing to Belfast that ‘we had better have a meeting
of that liaison committee before too long if we are not to be under ﬁre’.35
This renewed eﬀort towards reform also failed, and in the ﬁnal crisis of
Unionism between 1968 and 1972 there was no eﬀective liaison between its
Stormont and Westminster components. In early 1971 Robin Chichester-Clark
wrote to his brother James lamenting
that lack of liaison between themselves and the Northern Ireland Government. As you
know there used to be a system whereby everybody had opposite numbers and there used
to be a good deal of communication particularly in relation to legislation which came up
here and which was likely to aﬀect Northern Ireland in any way. This has now almost gone
by the board.36
Moreover, despite the looming threat to the survival of the devolved government,
a serious division arose in the spring of 1971 between Stormont and Westminster
Unionists over Heath’s Industrial Relations Bill – with Robin Chichester-Clark
warning that there needed to be a uniform code of industrial relations throughout
the United Kingdom, and that ‘ if the Northern Ireland Government decides to
delay a decision or worse decides not to enact similar legislation – the party at
Stormont cannot expect support from the Ulster members at Westminster ’.37
This tension, and comparative lack of dialogue, were the contexts against
which Edward Heath twice met the Westminster Unionists (on 16 December 1971
and 29 February 1972) in order to take soundings on the constitutional future of
Northern Ireland.38 It is true that the numbers of Westminster Unionists were
small ; but – as they recognized themselves in a post-mortem, conducted in April
1972 after the prorogation of Stormont – ‘with … no close political strategy either
inside the group or in consultation with the Stormont party, the Unionist inﬂu-
ence at Westminster has been much weaker and more diﬀuse than it should have
33 Minute, Liaison Committee, 12 June 1963, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/6.
34 JCC to RCC, 3 July 1963, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/6.
35 RCC to JCC, 21 Nov. 1963, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/7.
36 RCC to JCC, 21 Jan. 1971, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/22.
37 RCC? to JCC?, n.d., Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/22.
38 ‘Meeting between Ulster Unionist Party and Edward Heath in the House of Commons’, 16 Dec.
1971, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/23.
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been’.39 Even allowing for their numerical weakness, there was certainly the
potential for inﬂuence ; but the failure to develop a uniﬁed and coherent strategy
at Westminster, and the seeming inability to communicate and liaise with
Stormont, all prevented the potential becoming a serious and sustained reality.
Too late, on 18 April 1972, the Westminster Unionists accepted a renewed call for
‘unity of action’, and agreed to send one of their members for a weekly meeting
with Faulkner’s ex-cabinet : but, as James Molyneaux observed, ‘ the eﬀective
leadership of the Unionist Party would necessarily move to Westminster ’.40
I V
Unionism’s relationship with all British governments was critical ; but for the
parliamentarians of the Ulster Party the bond with Conservatism was peculiarly
complex and intimate. On the whole, characterizations of this relationship have
been inﬂuenced by its failures, and particularly by the complete inability of
Unionist MPs to avert the suspension of Stormont in 1972 (as if this feat had
been possible for eight MPs).41 Episodes such as this cannot be ignored, but it is
certainly necessary to elaborate their wider context more fully than has some-
times been done in the literature.
There can be little doubt that, after the First World War, support for Ulster
Unionism amongst British Conservatives was becoming less highly charged
and emotive than hitherto. However, relations remained close, in terms of
organization if not ideology. Ulster Unionist electioneering in the 1920s and
after was subsidized by Conservative Central Oﬃce; in the 1950s and 1960s
the Conservative Party kept a watchful eye on the Westminster seats,
and Westminster elections, in Northern Ireland; Northern Ireland, indeed, was
incorporated into the Central Oﬃce ﬁling systems as ‘area O’.42 In return the
Ulster Party generally took the Conservative whip; and there were occasions
when, despite their small numbers, they were strong enough (or were thought
to be strong enough) to make a diﬀerence to the arithmetic of parliamentary
power.43
When Labour was in power, the Ulster Party voted with the Opposition. In the
interwar period Craigavon’s close association with Conservatism combined
with the electoral dominance of that party meant that there were relatively few
39 ‘Secret : working paper of the Unionist parliamentary party at Westminster ’, Apr. 1972,
Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK, 3/24.
40 ‘Minutes of a meeting’, 18 Apr. 1972, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/37.
41 Norton, ‘Conservative politics ’, pp. 137–8.
42 Craigavon to Eyres-Monsell, 5 Dec. 1928, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/1. See e.g. ‘Constituency ﬁles,
Area O: Northern Ireland, Aug. 1950 – Aug. 1951 ’, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party
Archive, CCO 1/8 (part of a sequence of ﬁles dealing with Westminster elections in Northern Ireland).
Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, p. 84 (though Smith distinguishes between the organizational
closeness and ideological drift between the two parties).
43 Craigavon to Baldwin, 28 May 1929, Baldwin papers, v.36, fo. 182.
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strategic problems with this arrangement.44 But, as has been argued, Labour’s
eventual ascendancy tended to create problems for Unionism, and to drive a
wedge between Stormont (which generally wanted to keep Labour ministers on
side) and the Ulster Party (which took the Conservative whip). While there were
undoubtedly tensions, the Unionists’ schizoid approach to Westminster politics
was not without its possibilities ; Basil Brooke simultaneously courted Labour
ministers, while recommending to the Ulster Party that they should target bright
young Conservative backbenchers.45 Though there were some qualms about
the viability of nursing particular Tories, Brooke’s advice appears to have been
followed throughout the later 1940s.
This eﬀort can be seen as laying some foundations for the relatively strong
relationship which characterized the Ulster Party and the Conservative govern-
ment in the early and mid-1950s. This was an era when Unionism throughout the
United Kingdom was being consolidated: Scottish Unionism, no less than the
Ulster variant, was enjoying an Indian summer of popularity and inﬂuence. It is
often argued that the Second World War served to consolidate British national
identity and patriotic pride, and this aﬀected the diﬀerent constituent territories of
the United Kingdom. The Ulster Party and Ulster Unionism as a whole beneﬁted
from the generally favourable image of Northern Ireland that the war had helped
to furnish. The Ulster Party’s chairman in the 1950s, Sir David Campbell, the
governor of Malta from 1943 to 1952, was identiﬁed with the island’s heroic
wartime struggle. Wartime generals with strong Ulster Unionist associations
(like Viscount Alanbrooke) were also a striking feature of the British elite of the
1950s : Ivan Neill, a Stormont cabinet minister of the time, observed that
these men ‘enjoyed a wide-range of inﬂuence … [which] gradually faded in the
late 1950s ’.46
Given these contexts, the Ulster Party, which had a strong ex-oﬃcer and public
school ﬂavour, appears to have been relatively well assimilated, popular, and
(in certain circumstances) eﬀective. As has been noted, the 1950s (and, to a lesser
extent, the 1960s) were decades when the electoral concerns of Westminster
Unionism remained well integrated within the bureaucracy of Conservative
Central Oﬃce. In July 1954, the Conservative whip, Patrick Buchan Hepburn,
wrote to Basil Brooke saying that the Unionist members ‘without ex-
ception … have supported the government magniﬁcently, both as regards hard
work and attendance ’.47 Three new members of the Party – Samuel Knox-
Cunningham (elected in 1955), Lord Robert Grosvenor (1955) and Stratton Mills
(1959) – held parliamentary private secretaryships during the Macmillan govern-
ment ; and Knox-Cunningham (‘a ﬁfteen stone, six-foot-six rugger blue, who to
44 Craigavon to Baldwin, 28 July 1930, Baldwin papers, v.31, fo. 138.
45 Brooke to Ross, 20 Nov. 1945, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/2.
46 Ivan Neill, Church and state (Dunmurry, 1995), p. 58. Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, p. 83,
makes the case for a growing divergence in the 1950s and 1960s.
47 Buchan Hepburn to Brooke, 9 July 1954, PRONI, CAB 9J/6/4; Smith, ‘Ever reliable friends’,
pp. 95–101, ably chronicles the cooling of this relationship in the later 1950s.
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some suggested the image of Macmillan’s secret service gunman’) was parlia-
mentary private secretary to the prime minister himself. Robin Chichester-Clark
held oﬃce as a government whip (as a lord commissioner of the treasury and
comptroller of the royal household).48
The fundamental characteristic of the Ulster Party at this time was not that it
was marginal, but rather that it was too closely linked with the gentriﬁed
Conservative governments of Churchill, Macmillan, and Alec Douglas-Home.
There was a dual aspect to this. The expectations of local Unionists were raised
unrealistically by the supposed connections between their representatives and the
Macmillan government ; by 1963, Ulster Unionist constituency associations were
complaining that the overly intimate bond between the Ulster Party and
Conservatism was not now fully delivering for Northern Ireland.49 But, while
there were disappointed grass-roots expectations, the real diﬃculties lay else-
where. There can be little doubt that Harold Wilson and Labour’s increasing
antipathy for Ulster Unionism after 1964 was rooted both in the questionable
record of the Stormont regime and in the role of Unionism at Westminster in the
years of Conservative domination.
With Labour’s accession to power in 1964, Unionism and the Ulster Party
confronted a complex array of challenges. Issues of civil rights and discrimination,
particularly in the ﬁelds of housing and employment, were beginning to generate
anger amongst the Catholics of Ulster, and to provide the foundations for political
mobilization; the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) was formed in January 1964
to publicize a wide range of already controversial acts. The CSJ, in turn, found
support at Westminster amongst Labour backbenchers, many of whom gave their
backing to the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster (CDU), a body created in June
1965 in the Commons to promote the cause of civil rights in Northern Ireland.
While the CDU was beginning to apply pressure to Labour ministers, the Ulster
Party found itself in the frontline of the defence of the Stormont regime.
At the same time, Unionism had lost its Labour friends from the post-war era.
When Labour regained power in 1964, after thirteen years of Conservative
government, its front bench looked very diﬀerent from that of 1945–51 : Harold
Wilson and his colleagues were much less sympathetic ﬁgures than ‘Major Attlee ’
or Herbert Morrison. Moreover, the Ulster Party’s strategic location in the
Commons was also coming under increasingly critical scrutiny. Wilson was
elected in October 1964 with a majority of six at a time when the Ulster Unionists
were returning twelve supporters of the Conservative front bench. It would
doubtless be wrong to discount the likelihood that Wilson had a genuine concern
for the civil rights of the Nationalists of Northern Ireland, and a principled
48 Alastair Horne, Macmillan, 1957–1986: volume II of the oﬃcial biography (London, 1989), p. 161.
49 Walker,History, p. 144. Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, pp. 97–9. The ‘crisis of expectations’ in
the relationship between the Ulster Party and Macmillan’s government was foreshadowed by a similar
‘crisis ’ in the relationship between the Edwardian Ulster Party and the Balfour government : see
Jackson, Ulster Party, pp. 281–3.
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antipathy for Unionism. But he was clearly willing to be seen to consider limiting
the intervention of Westminster in return for the surrender by Ulster MPs of their
existing voting rights. The existence of this issue has been noted by scholars ; but
its signiﬁcance and fall-out have not yet been fully excavated and assessed.50
In April 1965, Wilson raised the question of the Ulster Party’s voting powers
with his attorney general.51 In May 1965, he broached the issue again during a
meeting with Terence O’Neill, and by October of that year Ken Bloomﬁeld was
registering alarm at the development of the ‘vexed question of the powers of the
Ulster members ’.52 In January 1966, Wilson wrote to his lord president of the
council, again emphasizing that there was a need to investigate the possibility that
Ulster MPs should be prevented from voting on ‘purely domestic matters aﬀect-
ing Great Britain ’.53 Some of the urgency was taken out of this issue after
31 March 1966, when the Labour government was returned with an increased
majority. But Wilson never really forgot the experience of governing at a time
when the eﬀective absence of the Ulster Party would have conﬁrmed his grip on
the House of Commons.
In January 1967, Wilson met Terence O’Neill, and speciﬁcally argued that :
within a period of about three years one of two things must happen. Either (1) the
Westminster Parliament would insist on interfering more and more with the internal aﬀairs
of Northern Ireland with the inevitable erosion of the ‘division of powers ’ which formed
the basis of the present arrangements or (2) an agreement would be reached whereby the
British parliament and government would refrain from interfering at all in Northern
Ireland aﬀairs provided that Northern Ireland members of the Westminster Parliament
observed the same discretion on voting on matters appertaining to Britain.54
O’Neill did not immediately rise to the bait ; but there is new evidence that he did
take Wilson’s ideas to the Westminster Unionists. In early 1967, Chichester-Clark
was shadow minister for public buildings and works (areas where responsibility
was devolved), and O’Neill pressed hard to get him moved to a portfolio which
dealt only with ‘reserved’ matters. Chichester-Clark’s role was discussed at a
meeting with Willie Whitelaw (as Conservative chief whip) and O’Neill in
February 1967, and subsequently at a meeting between O’Neill and the chairman
of the Ulster Unionist MPs, Willie Orr : Orr summarized the Unionists’ reading
of the matter by pointing out ‘ that much of the pressure from Labour’s left wing,
which Wilson fears, is occasioned by our voting record on such matters as
London local government … but if we were suddenly to withdraw eleven votes on
50 E.g. Thomas Hennessey, The origins of the Troubles (Dublin, 2005), p. 110; Peter Rose, How the
Troubles came to Northern Ireland (London, 2000), pp. 29, 35.
51 Attorney general to Wilson, 5 Apr. 1965, The National Archives, Kew (TNA), PREM 13/1663.
52 Memorandum of a meeting between Terence O’Neill and Harold Wilson, 19 May 1965, TNA,
PREM 13/1663. Bloomﬁeld to RCC, 6 Oct. 1965, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/6.
53 Wilson to lord president of the council, 31 Jan. 1966, TNA, PREM 13/1663. See also Rose,
Troubles, pp. 35–6, 62, 77, 174, 177.
54 Note for the record of 12 Jan. 1967 meeting, TNA, PREM 13/2266. See Hennessey, Origins, p. 116,
which mentions the meeting, but not all aspects of its fall-out.
468 A L V I N J A C K S ON
this sort of issue, how is the Conservative party going to feel? ’.55 For Ken
Bloomﬁeld, deputy secretary to the Northern Ireland cabinet, the way forward
rested with a voluntary code of conduct for Westminster Unionists, wherein
(inter alia) they agreed not to become spokespersons for subjects which ‘ in
Northern Ireland are the concern of our Government and Parliament ’.56 But,
despite this advocacy, a meeting of the Ulster Party on 22 February 1967 to
discuss O’Neill’s disclosures about Wilson’s stand brought a revelation of the still
livid jealousies separating Westminster Unionism and Stormont ; it was now felt,
even by those like Chichester-Clark, who were essentially sympathetic to the
Stormont prime minister, that O’Neill’s ‘ real fear ’ and fundamental concerns
were, not for his Westminster MPs, but rather the threatened ‘ tightening of the
screws on the Northern Ireland Government ’.57 In this situation, the Westminster
Unionists might well be expendable.
Even though a deal with Stormont was not immediately attainable, Wilson
remained preoccupied by the strategic importance of the Ulster members, and by
the possibility that they might be able to bring down a British government.
In November 1968, after the ﬁrst bloody unrest in Northern Ireland, he and
James Callaghan met O’Neill, Brian Faulkner (then Northern Ireland minister of
commerce) and Bill Craig (minister of home aﬀairs). This was a critical gathering,
when the British ministers were threatening a variety of ﬁnancial and
other sanctions if the Unionists failed to deliver reform in the areas of housing
allocation, the local government franchise, and the Special Powers Act. However,
Wilson chose to frame the entire meeting with references to the powers of the
Ulster Party at Westminster ; in his preliminary remarks, he complained that ‘ it
was not unthinkable that the Ulster members could bring down the United
Kingdom government by a vote on a matter completely divorced from Northern
Irish interests ’. He reiterated this point in his concluding statement, again
apparently hinting at the possibility of a deal ; he emphasized that the present
political crisis was exacerbated by the illogical situation that Ulster MPs could
freely vote on matters that were not the concern of Northern Ireland, but that
Westminster MPs could not intervene directly in the aﬀairs of Northern Ireland
where responsibility had been transferred by the Northern Ireland government.
He remained of the opinion that the public interest at large would be better
served by action by the Northern Ireland government to remedy these
grievances ; but if the Northern Ireland government failed to take such action a
more radical solution would have to be found.58
Depictions of the relationship between the Ulster Party and Edward Heath
naturally tend to be coloured by the realpolitik of March 1972, when the devolved
55 Diary notes, 1967–8, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/22.
56 Bloomﬁeld to RCC, 20 Feb. 1967, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/4.
57 Diary notes, 1967–8, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/22.
58 Summary note of a meeting with the prime minister of Northern Ireland, 4 Nov. 1968, TNA,
PREM 13/2847. The meeting, but not the allusions to the Westminster Unionists, is discussed in
Hennessey, Origins, p. 155.
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parliament at Stormont was prorogued.59 But such emphases do not take into
account the close and complex interconnection between Heath’s Conservatives
and Ulster Unionism, dating from Heath’s time (1951–9) as a Conservative whip.
Heath and Robin Chichester-Clark shared a connection, forged in the Whip’s
Oﬃce, which lasted until Heath’s death ; Chichester-Clark hosted Heath’s visits
to Northern Ireland, acted as his trusted observer at the Conservative leadership
election in 1965, and drafted many of his speeches on Northern Ireland as
Opposition Leader.60 When, in October 1968 and January 1969, Heath’s back-
benchers were unsettled by the violence in Northern Ireland, they approached
Chichester-Clark for assistance with their constituents’ queries.61 Throughout
1970, sympathetic Conservatives such as Bill Deedes or Nicholas Ridley used the
Westminster Unionists to learn about, and organize trips to, Northern Ireland.62
In March 1971, against the background of the resignation of James Chichester-
Clark, Westminster Unionists were meeting with likeminded Conservatives such
as Philip Goodhart and Julian Amery in order to co-ordinate pressure upon the
Heath government, while other backbench Tories such as John Biﬀen were
regularly speaking in strong support of Ulster Unionism.63 As late as January
1972, Brian Faulkner was reporting that he was receiving help from Conservative
backbenchers such as Antony Buck and Norman St John Stevas.64 The trouble
with Westminster Unionism was not that it wholly lacked, but rather that it had
insuﬃcient, support ; and that its inﬂuence over Heath, though real, was ulti-
mately trumped by more powerful factors within the British–Irish relationship.65
Edward Heath and the Tories were returned to power in the British general
election of 18 June 1970. As early as 12 July 1970, Robin Chichester-Clark (whose
brother, James, had been prime minister of Northern Ireland since O’Neill’s
resignation in April 1969) was arguing to Reginald Maudling, the Conservative
home secretary, that the reform policy in Northern Ireland had produced few
identiﬁable gains, and little generosity of response.66 Heath and Maudling met
Chichester-Clark, for whom the failing security situation in Northern Ireland
59 Norton, ‘Conservative politics ’, pp. 131ﬀ.
60 Peter Emery, ‘1922 Committee: election of a leader’, 23 July 1965’, Chichester-Clark papers,
CCLK 7/1.
61 Airey Neave to RCC, 17 Jan. 1969, Patrick Jenkin to RCC, 23 Jan.1969, Chichester-Clark papers,
CCLK 1/9; RCC to Bernard Weatherall, David Waddington, John Osborn, Harry Legge-Bourke,
Oct. 1968, CCLK 3/28.
62 Deedes to RCC, 10 Sept. 1970, Ridley to RCC, 28 Feb. 1970, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK
3/14, 20.
63 Goodhard to RCC, 23 Mar. 1971, Biﬀen to RCC, 26 Mar. 1971, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK
3/22; Biﬀen, copy of speech to Cambridge Young Conservatives, 27 Sept. 1971, CCLK 3/23. Cf.
Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, pp. 72–3, quoting Biﬀen in Apr. 1974, on the eve of the failure of the
Executive. 64 Faulkner to RCC, 14 Jan. 1972, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/10.
65 For the growing tensions see e.g. Mills to Pym, 15 Oct. 1971, Chichester-Clark papers, e.g. CCLK
3/23.
66 RCC to Maudling, 12 July 1970, TNA, PREM 15/101. See also Jeremy Smith, ‘ ‘‘Walking a
real tightrope of diﬃculties ’’ : Sir Edward Heath and the search for stability in Northern Ireland’,
Twentieth Century British History, 18 (2007), pp. 219–53, and Paul Arthur, ‘The Heath government and
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was a particular issue, together with London’s evidently insensitive handling
of the Stormont government.67 Progress was promised; and indeed at about
this time – July 1970 – a gaggle of experts (including Sir Charles Carter, Lord
Crowther, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, and Thomas Wilson) was commissioned to
generate ideas for a possible political settlement in Northern Ireland.68 But
Heath’s learning curve was very steep ; in October 1970, for example, he was still
referring to Sir John Peck, the British ambassador to Ireland (which had not been
associated with the Commonwealth since 1949) as ‘our High Commissioner in
Dublin’.69
By the beginning of December 1970, Chichester-Clark felt that there had been
little headway, and wrote again to Heath.70 This was now part of a wider eﬀort on
the part of the Westminster Unionists to inﬂuence the Conservative government.
The quality and seriousness of this wider onslaught undoubtedly varied ; Stratton
Mills and Chichester-Clark oﬀered reasoned and detailed indictments, while
Willie Orr, a genial ex-oﬃcer, emoted to Maudling against Sir John Peck: ‘My
dear Reggie, I have only just been handed this [newspaper interview with Peck].
Could anything be more appalling? ’71 Despite Orr’s clubland bluster, Heath took
the broad Unionist assault seriously ; he minuted Chichester-Clark’s letter of
1 December 1970, scribbling to Burke Trend, the cabinet secretary : ‘Urgent. This
is a mixture of very important points and oversensitivity. Please examine all of
them urgently. ’72
But here the problematic relations between the Westminster Unionists and
Belfast which characterized the Stormont years once again came into play.
Heath’s demand for action landed on the desk of Maudling. Maudling in turn
contacted the Stormont prime minister, James Chichester-Clark, who by now
was beginning to give way under the pressures of oﬃce, increasingly hesitant and
incoherent, overly eager to win acceptance in London, easily ambushed in dia-
logue and negotiations, and pathetically grateful and apologetic. Maudling was
able to report to Heath that ‘Robin [Chichester-Clark] seems to take a more
jaundiced view … than does James Chichester-Clark, with whom I have had full
and detailed discussions. ’73 This, doubtless, was an accurate assessment ; and it
helped to take much momentum out of the Ulster Party assault, which never-
theless continued to develop into the summer and autumn of 1971. The Party and
Stormont, indeed the two Chichester-Clark brothers, were apparently divided
over the seriousness of the issues which had been raised. This was a classic
Northern Ireland’, in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, eds., The Heath government, 1970–1974:
a reappraisal (London, 1996), p. 241.
67 Minute of a meeting between Chichester-Clark, Heath, and Maudling, 17 July 1970, TNA,
PREM 15/101. 68 Heath to Trend, 30 July 1970, TNA, PREM 15/101.
69 Heath to Armstrong, 25 Oct. 1970, TNA, PREM 15/474.
70 Chichester-Clark to Heath, 1 Dec. 1970, TNA, PREM 15/474.
71 Orr to Maudling, 23 Nov. 1970, TNA, PREM 15/474.
72 Chichester-Clark to Heath, 1 Dec. 1970, TNA, PREM 15/474. Cf. Smith, ‘Walking a real
tightrope’, pp. 248–9. 73 Maudling to Heath, 31 Dec. 1970, TNA, PREM 15/474.
T H E U L S T E R P A R T Y A T W E S TM I N S T E R 471
example of the ineﬀective liaison between Stormont and the Ulster Party which
marked virtually the entire period of the devolution experiment.
This division between the Ulster Party and Stormont, so central a theme of this
article, characterized the last weeks of the devolved parliament. Direct rule had
been an element of British contingency planning since early 1969; legislation to
eﬀect this end had been part of the planning, and had been regularly raised, or
extracted from the ﬁles, at particular moments of crisis in 1969–71.74 The intro-
duction of internment in August 1971 was widely seen as a last gambit for the
existing constitutional arrangements ; but in fact it was the killings in Derry on
‘Bloody Sunday’, 30 January 1972, which precipitated the ﬁnal removal of
Stormont.
The Ulster Party did little to avert the disaster which overwhelmed Stormont,
but then the events which were in play were far beyond its inﬂuence or control.
However, despite its deep roots in British contingency planning, direct rule was
by no means a ﬁxed goal of British policy, which on the whole favoured sub-
contracting the whole Ulster mess to the devolved authorities. Opinions are
divided in the literature, but the evidence suggests that Heath was only ﬁnally
converted to the notion of suspending Stormont very late in the day. As late as
1 March 1972 Heath and his ministers were debating a proposal (favoured by
Maudling) that Stormont should be curtailed, but preserved, and draft legislation
to this eﬀect was in fact commissioned.75 Famously, Heath put the proposal for a
diminished Stormont to Brian Faulkner and his ministers at a critical meeting in
Downing Street on 22 March 1972. It was certainly thought likely that Faulkner
would reject the government’s scheme; but Heath and his minister could not be
sure. In fact Faulkner, who was armed with counter-proposals, did refuse to deal ;
and he and his Stormont cabinet resigned on 23 March.
It is now clear from the oﬃcial (and other) archives that the government had
been careful to take a wide variety of soundings within the Northern Irish es-
tablishment as to the desirability and practicality of direct rule. In December 1971,
Ken Bloomﬁeld secretly visited the British representative in Northern Ireland,
Howard Smith, to argue both for direct rule and a role for the Irish government
in Northern aﬀairs.76 There were other, conﬁrmatory, perspectives from within
the Unionist elite. Smith subsequently interviewed Faulkner’s minister for devel-
opment, the serpentine Roy Bradford (‘both politically devious and in private
conversation indiscreet ’), who pronounced in favour of direct rule, as did other
Unionist worthies.77 On 17 February 1972 Maudling met with the leaders of the
Westminster Unionists, Chichester-Clark and Mills, and sounded them out on
‘government by commission ’ for Northern Ireland (Chichester-Clark raised,
74 E.g. Michael Latham to Heath, 6 Aug. 1970, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/22.
75 Trend to Heath, 1 Mar. 1970, TNA, PREM 15/1003; Heath to the queen, 9 Mar. 1970, TNA,
PREM 15/1004. For a narrative of the count-down to prorogation, see Thomas Hennessey, The
evolution of the Troubles, 1970–1972 (Dublin, 2007), pp. 322–40.
76 Robert Ramsay, Ringside seats : an insider’s view of the crisis in Northern Ireland (Dublin, 2009), pp. 106–7.
77 Smith to Home Oﬃce, 4 Mar. 1972 (telegram), TNA, PREM 15/1003.
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hypothetically, the issue of the long-term suspension of Stormont).78 Chichester-
Clark and Mills subsequently met privately with Ian Paisley, who ‘clearly has no
love for Stormont or Faulkner. Although P[aisley] is not going to advocate it, it
seems to me that he would broadly accept direct rule. ’79
Maudling having prepared the way, Heath met the entire Ulster Party in the
House of Commons on 29 February, and was given their take on direct rule.
James Kilfedder was particularly supportive, but the general view of the meeting
was that direct rule was negotiable : any qualms arose over timing (‘ this might be
done in the fulness of time’) rather than from the principle itself.80 Amongst the
other issues raised, the Westminster Unionists were keen to argue for their own
enhancement in the event of Stormont’s demise – that ‘ if Stormont was abol-
ished, this would mean an increase in the number of Northern Ireland MPs at
Westminster ’.81 It took an interval of eight days before an appalled Faulkner got
to hear of the meeting: ‘ I believe ’, he complained to Robin Chichester-Clark,
‘ that solidarity on this issue could have an important bearing on how the situation
in Northern Ireland is viewed by responsible people in Great Britain, not least the
British government. ’82
Faulkner was correct in his assessment : the critical impression conveyed by
this intelligence-gathering was one of division and disorientation. The signals that
the Westminster Unionists were emitting suggested that they would not oﬀer
impassioned and coherent opposition to direct rule, and such proved to be the
case. It was certainly recognized that some individuals were unreliable guides ; but
the government’s wider soundings within the Unionist elite indicated that
there would be no united movement of protest if Heath moved against
Stormont.83 On 24 February, Burke Trend, the cabinet secretary, had mused
over how to deal with Faulkner in the event of direct rule, and had wondered
‘how far we might isolate him by political action, i.e. by splitting the Protestants
as far as possible ’.84 But in fact there was no need for political action to ‘ split the
Protestants ’. From Westminster down, they were more than capable of splitting
themselves.
It is sometimes observed that, in the aftermath of these events, the Ulster Party
was divided and ineﬀective, with only some taking a tough stand against Heath’s
action, and others (like Robin Chichester-Clark and Stratton Mills) moving closer
78 Minutes of a meeting between Reginald Maudlin, RCC, and W. S. Mills, 17 Feb. 1972,
Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/37. This meeting is not mentioned in Hennessey, Evolution of the
Troubles.
79 ‘Notes of a meeting at the House of Commons, 7 March 1972’, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK
3/37.
80 Memorandum of a meeting between the prime minister and the Ulster Unionist MPs, 29 Feb.
1972, TNA, PREM 15/1003. This meeting is not mentioned in Hennessey, Evolution of the Troubles.
81 Minute of meeting by Stratton Mills, 29 Feb. 1972, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 3/14.
82 Faulkner to RCC, 8 Mar. 1972, Chichester-Clark papers, CCLK 1/2.
83 Record of a discussion between Lord Grey of Naunton and the prime minister, 21 Mar. 1972,
TNA, PREM 15/1004.
84 Trend to prime minister, 24 Feb. 1972, TNA, PREM 15/1003.
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to Conservatism.85 In fact Robin Chichester-Clark’s unpublished memoir of
22 March 1972, the day that Stormont was prorogued, suggests that events had
not turned out quite as Heath had expected, and that he now indeed relied upon
the possibility of creating further division within Ulster Unionism. Late on that
evening, Chichester-Clark was summoned to No. 10 Downing Street, where
he was smuggled in through the garden: ‘ the Prime Minister, sitting by himself,
said ‘‘Good Evening’’ and then maintained one of his longest and most dis-
concerting silences before volunteering ‘‘ this has been the worst day of my
life ’’ ’.86 According to Chichester-Clark, Heath asked him to serve as minister of
state at the new Northern Ireland Oﬃce. For the moment, the temptations of
oﬃce were refused; but they were clearly designed to divide the ‘reasonable ’
Unionists from their more recalcitrant brethren.
V
The Ulster Party demonstrates some of the dynamics of regional parliamentary
groupings in an era of devolution. The Party has been condemned as second rate,
the natural by-product of a constitution where ‘real ’ politics had apparently been
sub-contracted out of Westminster. In this characterization, the Party failed be-
cause of its low calibre, and above all because of its marginal role within the
British party system. In the early 1880s, Parnell had supplied a model of eﬀective
independent parliamentary action for such parties ; but even he had ultimately
fallen victim to the constricting embrace of British Liberalism. Parnellite practice,
rather than theory, appeared to signal the fate of all small, national, or provincial
parties struggling for survival at Westminster.
Some of the condemnations are accurate ; but an alternative, and more varied,
reading of the Ulster Party’s history is also possible. Its eﬃciency certainly could
be lamentably weak, constrained by a range of inﬂuences. But equally there is
some evidence to suggest that in the aftermath of devolution the Party continued
(in some respects) to perform well, undertaking useful work over matters such as
the Boundary Commission. If there was a gradual tendency for political talent
(such as it was) to coalesce within the devolved parliament, then there also may
have been a period of grace when Westminster continued to function as an im-
portant focus for regional loyalties and respect.
The Party was certainly limited by a range of structural problems. It never
created a lasting and successful mechanism for liaison with Stormont, even
though this issue was revisited periodically from the late 1920s onwards – and
systematically from c. 1943 onwards. This meant that the provincial parliament
and its representatives in London often took quite diﬀerent stands on particular
issues, and this in turn meant that the wider cause which they embodied, Ulster
Unionism, was sometimes relegated. The cacophony of diﬀering Unionist
85 Norton, ‘Conservative politics ’, p. 134. Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’, p. 71.
86 Notes on Edward Heath’s Course of my life, CCLK 1/22.
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opinions on the issue of direct rule helped to ensure the easy suspension of the
devolved parliament itself. In a sense, the Westminster Unionists’ (at best) highly
ambiguous reaction to direct rule was a ﬁtting culmination to ﬁfty years of often
jealous and defensive interaction with Stormont.
The history of the Party also demonstrates that there was no automatic equa-
tion between provincialism and marginality. Its members were relatively well
placed in the world of early and mid-1950s Conservatism, even if diﬃculties
subsequently multiplied.87 It was also obvious that even a small number of prov-
incial MPs could occasionally exercise a disproportionate inﬂuence over the fate
of governments. These two factors – the integration of the Ulster Party within
Conservatism, and the Party’s strategic signiﬁcance – were a major preoccu-
pation for Harold Wilson and Labour MPs after 1964. One of the more intriguing
counter-factual speculations in modern Irish history involves assessing the wider
implications of a deal between Wilson and Terence O’Neill on the powers of the
Ulster Party. At the very least, Wilson’s concerns illustrate the kind of controversy
which the powers and numbers of regional representatives might generate in the
context of devolution.
In the end, no crude characterization of the Ulster Party will suﬃce. The Party
certainly failed in some critical respects. This was not because of any particular
intellectual deﬁcit, although the quality of individual parliamentary candidates
certainly gave periodic cause for concern. Instead, the Party’s dogged individu-
alism, divisions, and jealousies, its unwillingness to communicate with Stormont,
and its unrelenting Conservatism all created diﬃculties which would later prove
disastrous. The central paradox of the Party’s existence was that, for much of its
life, it sought simultaneously to be liberated from Belfast and to be enslaved by
Conservative Central Oﬃce. This meant, ultimately, that, far from being a prop
to Stormont, the Party ultimately contributed to its demise. Here, as elsewhere,
the practice of devolution proved self-destructive.
87 See Smith, ‘ ‘‘Ever reliable friends’’ ’.
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